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A Goal
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E

lection reformshave attracted substantial
attention since the troubled elections of
2000. Some address problems in the adminis
trationof elections. Others aim to regulate the
conduct of elected officials and lobbyists.A
thirdcategory affects the structureby which
elections are conducted. It is not clear whether
the same over-arching problem motivates inter
est in these reforms.One common thememay
be thatpublic confidence in representation suf
fers as a result of actual or perceived deficien
cies in the conduct of elections and elected
officials. The failure to count votes accurately,
the fact thateligible voters find they are unable
to vote, the inabilityof minor parties to access
ballots, revelations of scandalous relations be
tween representativesand lobbyists, thepower
of wealthy donors, the lack of "civility" in po
litical discourse, the uncompetitive nature of
many elections, may all somehow act together
to erode public trust,and reduce participation
and engagement with representativedemocracy.
In considering contemporary electoral ar
rangements,we must ask, "what is themain
problem that reforms intend to target,and what
are themechanisms by which reformsmight
fix the problem?" If public cynicism about rep
resentativedemocracy is part of theproblem
that reformsare sup
posed to fix, it is not

by
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clear
Donovan,

Western
Washington
University

how much

im

provement in the admin

ofelections
can
istration

accomplish. The sources
of public cynicism
about elections may
include a polarized party system and uncom
petitive elections that fail tomobilize or en
gage many citizens. Contemporary reform
proposals thatattractbipartisan supportmay
have littleeffecton thisproblem.

Reformsof Old: The Responsible
PartyModel
One of themost enduring academic state
ments in favor of political reformwas the
American Political Science Association's report
(1950) "Toward aMore Responsible Two-Party
System," which called forwholesale changes
to how American political parties operated. In
1950, "weak" parties were the targetof reform
ers. One of the "problems" reformersidentified
was thatAmerican parties did not provide an
adequate opportunity for the electorate to hold
govemment accountable. Parties in power were
not able to control theirmembers in office, nor
coordinate thebranches of govermment,nor
effectively implementprogrammatic goals that
defined the party.The lack of intra-partycohe
PSOnline
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sion leftvoters unable to assign responsibility
to a party and unable to select between distinc
tive governing and opposition party options.
The reportproposed several reforms tomake
the twomajor parties more hierarchical, cohe
sive, programmatic, and ideologically distinct
fromeach other.These included (butwere not
limited to): strengtheningnational party offices
with more funding and staffresources; chang
ing rules to allow parties a meaningful role in
financing congressional candidates; increasing
party discipline inCongress; creatingmore
coherent party leadership over rank and file
members of Congress; closing participation in
nomination contests to registeredpartisans;
giving rank-and-filepartymembers direct con
trolover delegate selection to national conven
tions; placing greater emphasis on national
policy in congressional elections; and placing a
greater emphasis on policy in party platforms.
For decades after the issue of the report, the
fragmentationof the party system at the elite
level, the shift to candidate-centered presiden
tial nominations, the decline of attachments to
parties in the electorate, and the lack of collec
tive responsibility in theAmerican political
system remained problems of concern forpolit
ical science (e.g., Polsby 1983; Wattenberg
1991; 1998; Fiorina 1980).
There is some ironyupon reviewing the re
port.We have not heard as much in recent
years about the ideological congruence of the
parties, nor as much about a lack of party
unity inCongress. Enough has transpired to
create a situationwhere arrangements appear a
bit likewhat the reportwished for.Party iden
tificationplayed a strongerrole in structuring
voter behavior by the late 1990s than itdid 30
years earlier (Bartels 2002). Party leadership in
Congress, although by no means parliamentary,
ismore cohesive and hierarchical than in de
cades past (Sinclair 2006). Even with "soft
money" excluded, parties now play a much
larger role in financing congressional races,
and in recruitingcandidates.

Party Polarization
Evidence thatparties are more internally
cohesive and ideologically distinct can be seen
in floor voting inCongress (Groseclose et al.
1999; Poole and Rosenthal 1997), and in pub
lic attitudes and behavior. The proportion of all
floor votes where most House Democrats voted
one way and most House Republicans voted
the other increased through the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s. The percent of Democrats voting
togetheragainst Republicans who voted to
gether on such unity votes increased steadily
through2000 (Donovan and Bowler 2004, 44).
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Scholarship in political science has
Figure 1
moved from a 1950s concern that
Floor Votes ofMembers of 109th Congress, by TheirVote
Democrat and Republican elites (and
Share in Previous Election
voters) were often indistinguishable
from each other on many measures
(e.g., Campbell et al. 1960), to a more
0.58
recent debate about whether the polar
ization of American parties exists only
at the elite level (Fiorina et al. 2005),
0.38
or at both the elite level and in the
mass public (Layman and Carsey
2002; Hetherington 2001).
0.18
___
_____X
_______
__
One less documented aspect of this
polarization is thatDemocrats increas
-0.22
ingly dislike Republican candidates,
and Republicans increasingly dislike
Democratic candidates. Since 1968,
Democratic partisan identifiershave
given Republican presidential candi
dates lowermarks on feeling ther
mometer scores measured inAmerican
National Election Study (NES) sur
-.
0 .462
13 i 30 49 30
E LnL
35
ranked
veys. On average, Democrats
Ne:
President Richard M. Nixon at or
above 55 both years he won, and
score for representatives
in each
Note: Each bar represents
the average
DW-NOMINATE
type
placed President Gerald R. Ford
of district.-1 = most liberal,1 = most conservative.Representatives are categorized by their
around 50-in otherwords, Democrats
2004 vote share. The numberunder (over) each bar is the numberof districtsina category.
generally had positive or neutral feel
ings about theseRepublicans. By
2004. however. Democrats ratedPresi
incumbentcandidates' 2004 vote share. This illustrates that the
dent George W. Bush a cool 34, and Republicans were cooler
towardDemocratic presidential nominee JohnKerry in 2004
safestDemocrats had themost liberal floor votes, while mar
than theywere to any Democratic presidential candidate other
ginal Democrats3 had more centrist records.The most marginal
thanGeorge McGovern.' One explanation of these trends is that
Republicans also had themost centrist records among Republi
conservative Southern voters have migrated from theDemo
cans. Marginality is also themechanism that translatesnational
cratic to theRepublican Party (Rhode 1991; Black and Black
vote-swings against a party into lost seats. In 2006, five of the
2003), while liberalRepublicans have been migrating to the
19 most marginal House Republicans were defeated, and six
Democrats. Another is that theparties' candidates now better
others in this category (where themember received between
reflect the clear, ideologically defined choices that the 1950
50-54.9% support in 2004) retired. In the next category (55%
APSA report recommended.
59.9%), eight of 40 incumbentswere defeated, and six retired.
Partisans' dislike of theirrival party's candidates extends to
(Nearly) every Republican seat that shifted in 2006 was in one
evaluations of congressional candidates as well. Democratic par
of the threemost marginal categories of Figure 1.Although Fig
tisans have held fairly steady in theirfeelings about Democratic
ure 1 demonstrates thatmarginal members have more centrist
congressional candidates since 1978, while becoming increas
voting records, several of themost marginal Republicans who
ingly cool towardRepublican congressional candidates. Republi
lost had DW-NOMINATE scores thatplaced thembeyond the
cans have grown more fond of Republican congressional
mean for theirparty (see Figure 2).4
candidates since 1992, and have become much cooler about
The 2006 midterm election may suggest thateven with polar
Democratic candidates since 1990. From 1990 to 2004 there
ization and limited competition,U.S. elections still act as a
was a steady increase in this gap. By accident or by design, the
mechanism thatallows voters to hold government accountable.
American political system is now characterized by polarized
But as the values above and below the bars in Figure 1 illus
party elites, and by polarized partisans.
trate,thereare fewmarginal districts.By 2002, therewere
The sources of thispolarization lie in demographic trends
fewer two-partycompetitiveU.S. House districts than at any
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), and in the structureof
point since 1900 (Donovan and Bowler 2004). A 5.5% vote
our election system (Cox and Katz 2002; Jacobson 2005). Re
swing against themajority party in 2006 yielded a 30-seat mid
term loss thatwas below average for comparable elections in
alignment in the South and inNew England has made the con
thepost-WWII era. In 1994, the 6.3% "Republican Revolution"
sistency base of the national parties more internallycohesive.
Nomination processes in homogeneous districts (Burden 2004),
swing against Democrats produced a 55-seat loss. The post
the role of "extremist" party activists (King 1997), and ideolog
Watergate swing of 5.8% against Republicans in 1974 produced
a 48-seat loss. A 5% swing yielded a 47-seat loss in 1958. The
icallymotivated patrons who control campaign fundsmay have
also shaped the pool of successful candidates and increased the
decline in competitionmeans itmay now take a larger swing to
move fewer seats (Issacharoff and Nagler 2006).
distance between theparties.
In addition, the small number of competitive districts in the
In addition to effectson themagnitude of seat swings,mar
U.S. House means that the vast majority of representativesare
ginality has consequences for the distributionof representation.
from safe seats. These districts elected members who were more
With fewer competitive seats, thereare fewer representatives
extreme ideologically than thenational median voter (or the
in the center.This is illustrated in Figure 2, which displays the
median districtnationally).2 Figure 1 plots theDW-NOMINATE
number of representatives in the 109th Congress across the
scores formembers of the 109th Congress, categorized by the
ideological range (representedby DW-NOMINATE
scores).
682
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Figure 2
Distribution of Representation in the U.S.
House, 109th Congress
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Figure 3
Party Identification;Proportion of
Independents, 1952-2004
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Source: National Election Study.

with
Note: Bars reflectthe numberof representatives
DW-NOMINATE scores in the ranges listedon the x-axis.
more
Values to the leftare more liberal,values to the right
conservative.N = 434, mean = -0.02.

Note: The lowerthree lines plot trends in the percent of NES
measure
respondents replying"independent"to the initialthree-part
thenby theirresponses to the follow-up
of party identification,
question asking ifthey"lean" towardone of themajor parties.

Those farthestfrom the center tend to come from safer seats
(see Figure 1) and thus aremost insulated fromnational vote
swings against theirparty.
The bimodal distribution in Figure 2 demonstrates the ab
sence of a center in theAmerican political system. It is a distri
bution at odds with the ideological self-placement of the
American electorate,which has thequalities of a normal, "bell
shaped" distribution (Fiorina et al. 2005). Yet in theHouse, the
median Democratic representative in the 109th Congress was
reflectedby liberalmembers such as Patrick Kennedy (RI) and
Howard Berman (CA). The median Republican by conservatives
Dennis Hastert (IL) and Virgil Goode (VA), a vocal opponent of
Muslim immigrationand of a Muslim being swom-in to the
109thCongress with theKoran. In 2004, thepresidential candi
dates were also linked to the ideological poles of theirparty in
Congress. This can be seen when Bush and Kerry are placed on
a similar roll-call vote measure of ideology. Kerry's floor votes
placed him to the leftof a largemajority of senators fromhis
party,while Bush's (inferred) issue positions placed him to the
rightof nearly all senators fromhis party (Clinton et al. 2004).

votes of people who identifywith a party and who continue to
vote, fewer people identifywith parties today.The 2000 NES
measure of partisan affiliation found 40% of Americans self
identifyingas independent, thehighest level since the survey
began in 1952. It is true thatmost of these independents report
"leaning" toward a major partywhen prompted, and when their
vote choices are limited to candidates from themajor parties
theyare, behaviorally, quite similar to partisan identifiers(Keith
et al. 1992). But when it comes to theirattitudes about the two
party system, independent "leaners" appear more like "pure"
independents thanpartisans. "Leaners" have little regard for
maintaining the two-partysystem, they are more likely to sup
port third-partycandidates, and theyprefer divided government
(Donovan et al. 2005; Bowler et al. 2006). A substantial propor
tionof Americans fail to identifywith a party system that
presents increasinglypolarized choices. And while barriers to
voting have been reduced,5 turnoutdeclined (outside the South)
or at best remained stagnant from 1972 to 2000.6
The rise of ideologically cohesive parties has not engaged
more citizens nor led them to thinktheirelections provide a
mechanism to hold government accountable. Figure 4 illustrates
thatapart fromRepublicans in 2004, there is little to suggest that
people feltgovernmentwas more responsive to elections than in
previous decades. Using the standardNES measure of "having a
say in government,"Figure 5 found 2004 approaching a record
low of political efficacy forAmericans. Data such as these in
Figures 4 and 5 suggest thata malaise about the efficacy of elec
tions and representativedemocracy has persisted since the 1980s.
Some suggest that low tumout and cynicism about represen
with the political
tativedemocracy reflectpublic frustration
choices American parties present (Amy 2002). Although it is
difficult to establish the causal relationships between elite polar
ization, apathy toward parties, and cynicism about elections and
voter participation, participation is associated with thepolariza
tion ofAmerican elections. Safe, politically homogeneous legis
lative seats not only produce representatives fartherfrom a
national median voter, but these uncompetitive districts have

Be Careful What

You Wish

For

Whatever the causes of elite polarization, our currentpolitical
environment reflects some (ormuch) of what the 1950 reform
ers wished for.This begs the questions: Having achieved an
outcome somewhat similar towhat a previous generation of re
formersaspired to, are we better or worse off as a result? Is
there increased electoral accountability? Is theregreater engage
ment with representativedemocracy?
If standardmeasures of behavior and public attitudes about
electoral politics are used to answer thisquestion, the answers
might be "no." As of 2004, cynicism about elections was near
(or at) the highest levels recorded in the era of modemnAmeri
can survey research.Attachments tomajor parties reached a
record low in 2000. Consider the data in Figure 3. Although
partisanship may now play a strongerrole in structuringthe

PSOnline
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Figure 4
Do ElectionsMake Government Pay
Attention?
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Note: Percent saying "a good deal," by party identification.

Figure 5
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Note: Percentwho disagree with the statement"mostpeople have
no say," by party

identification.

less campaign activity,which translates into less participation
especially for the young and forpeople with less interestin pol
itics thanpartisans (Donovan and Tolbert 2007). Uncompetitive
states also correspond with less participation in presidential con
tests (Bowler and Donovan n.d.).

A Missing Middle
A two-partysystem dominated by ideologically polarized par
ties and uncompetitive elections may do little to link a large
part of the public with representativedemocracy. Indeed, trends
toward having ideologically distinct parties and less electoral
competition correspond with greater cynicism about representa
tive democracy. This cynicismmay be exacerbated if (realisti
684

cally or unrealistically) citizens devalue partisan conflict
(Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). If this is the case, then con
temporaryelectoral arrangementsmay alienate a substantial pro
portion of the electorate.
Admittedly, the discussion heremisrepresents what the 1950s
reformerssought.Although there is evidence of greater polariza
tion among party elites and party identifiers,thisneed notmean
we ever achieved a responsible two-partysystem.The system
described in the 1950 reportwas modeled on the assumption of
legislative supremacy or at least legislative paritywith the exec
utive. This is a formof government thathas been on thewane.
Furthermore,one forgottenaspect of the report is that it stressed
theneed to "give all sections of the country a real voice" in
elections,7 rather than continue with the "blight of one-party
monopoly" thatresults in the concentration of campaign re
sources in a few pivotal areas.
Even with theone-party South transformed,thereare fewer
two-partycompetitiveU.S. House contests now than in 1950.
The decline in competitive districts and the rise of incumbent
advantages were noted decades ago (e.g.,Mayhew 1974; Fere
john 1977), but conditions have become even less competitive
since then.Presidential and House elections are now structured
such thatmany people live in places where theyhave no influ
ence on elections. These voters are not exposed to national elec
tion campaigns unless they live in a handful of competitive
presidential states such as Ohio, or in a rare, competitiveU.S.
House district.The U.S. has polarized parties without competi
tive elections; distinctive parties thatoffermany voters irrele
vant elections between candidates who may be too extreme for
them,with only one candidate having a chance towin.

Competition,

and

Partisan polarization, then,bymorphing with uncompetitive
elections, has gone frombeing part of thepreferredsolution to
what ails theAmerican system, to possibly being a key force
driving discontentwith representativedemocracy. By extension it
may also be driving interestin election reform.If either the fail
ure to representthe large center of theAmerican electorate or the
dearth ofmeaningful elections (or both) is the source of discon
tentwith representativedemocracy, thenwe must consider how
various contemporary reformistimpulses affectparty polarization
and electoral competition.At one level, it seems there is some
consensus among reformproponents that"something" should be
done to restore"faith" inAmerican elections. For example, we
might find substantial agreement thatrules should insure that
only eligible voters vote, and that theirvotes are counted as accu
ratelyas possible. There may be much less consensus about other
reformgoals, and even less about how these goals should be ac
complished. Nonetheless, letus, for the sake of argument,as
sumewe have consensus about some basic goals and thatwe
have knowledge of how to achieve such goals. Assume thatevery
vote cast would be a perfect reflectionof what only eligible, par
ticipatingvoters intended.Assume thatethics reformsprevent
legislators fromaccepting free luxury travel and skybox tickets
from lobbyists.Assume, further,thatvoter registrationrecord
keeping was flawless and presented eligible voters no barriers to
participating.Assume thatpoll workers were perfectly trained,
every polling place had optimal resources, and early votingwas
available forevery eligible voter.Would, as a resultof all of this,
themass public come to participatemore, or to see elections as
more meaningful?Would it leadmore people to perceive that
therewere elected officialswho shared theirpreferences?Would
such reformsincreases thepublic's sense thatelections make
governmentpay attention,or theirbelief thatvoting and elections
give thema say inwhat government does?
PS October

2007
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Perhaps-but only as much as attitudes about theefficacy of
elections are driven by perceptions of accuracy in registration,
fairness in vote counts, problems with butterflyballots, hanging
chads, and the latest revelations about improperbehavior by leg
islators and lobbyists.Downward trends in opinions about elec
toral efficacy displayed here, however, pre-date the2000 Florida
election fiasco thatmotivated theHelp America Vote Act
(HAVA) and also pre-date the JackAbramoff /Duke Cunning
ham /Mark Foley /Tom Delay et al. indictmentsand scandals
thatmotivated the2006-2007 round of ethics reforms.The most
accurate registrationrecords and vote counting systems, further
more, would likely do little to affectelectoral competition nor
affecthow themajor parties and the electoral system represent
(or fail to represent) thepreferences of marginally interested
Americans who thinkof themselves as centristsormoderates.
HAVA-like reformsare motivated by events thatoccur in
competitive contests (e.g., Florida and Ohio) where high num
bers of voters are mobilized by competitive campaigns, where
polling places are swamped with voters, and where subtle local
administrative acts can have the capacity to affectelection re
sults.HAVA has generated substantial funds for research into
theminutia of themachinery of elections. HAVA-like adminis
trativereformsmay make itmore difficult to steal elections, but
they fail to address the fact thatmost elections inmost places
remain so uncompetitive that they are not worth stealing.

Make

Elections Worth

Stealing

I suggest above thatcompetition resulting frommarginal dis
trictsmay also affectpolitical polarization. Electoral
competition-the mobilization of candidates and campaign re
sources in an environmentwhere election outcomes are rela
tivelyuncertain-is also a force thatcan mobilize people to
participate in politics. Empirical research suggests thatpeople
respond tomeaningful electoral choices and electoral competi
tion.Competition inU.S. House races increases turnout(Cox
andMunger 1989). Multiparty systems have higher voter turn
out (Blais and Carty 1990) and higher levels of citizen satisfac
tionwith how democracy works (Anderson and Guillory 1997).
Referendums and initiativesbring people to thepolls and
choices associated with thesemay stimulate political efficacy
(Smith and Tolbert 2004). Local "semi-PR systems" used
(rarely) in theU.S. can expand the range of candidates compet
ing for office, and thus increase campaign activity and voter
turnout(Bowler et al. 2004).
Efforts to improve poll-worker training,and improve the ac
curacy of vote tabulation and voter registrationrolls are neces
sary and laudable, but errors associated with votingmachines,
and the effectsof duplicity in election administrationare most
likely to have consequences where election outcomes are rela
tivelyuncertain. Thus, an electoral contextwhere more contests
are marginal may increase incentives for fraud.This should be a
primary goal for reforms.Electoral competition is greater in

marginal seats. It is themechanism thatmakes elections more
responsive to the distributionof mass preferences, themecha
nism thatprovides accountability, and themechanism by which
citizens are mobilized and engaged by representativedemocracy.
There are reformsthat targetforces beyond voter interactions
with poll-workers and votingmachinery. How might these affect
electoral competition?Reducing barriers to candidate entrymight
provide voterswith more choices. Burden's (2007) article in this
symposium finds thatballot access rules have clear effectson
whetherminor-party candidates appear on ballots, but he also
finds theircandidacies have littleeffecton election outcomes.
Indeed, theirvote share is inversely related to thecompetitive
ness of races theyenter. In a Single Member Simple Plurality
(SMSP) systemwhere such candidates have littlechance of rep
resentation,they remain a protest vehicle. Barriers to entrymay
also be reduced via public financingof campaigns.Werner and
Mayer's (2007) article in this symposium shows that thepublic
campaign finance options inMaine andArizona are particularly
attractive to candidates in the least competitive races,which may
mute theprograms' effectson electoral competitiveness. Reduc
ing barriers to voter participation is also promoted as a means to
getmore citizens engaged with elections. However Gronke
et al.'s (2007, this symposium) studyof early voting demon
strates that the effectsofmaking votingmore convenient are
modest. Without increasingmobilization effortsand interestin
elections, convenience votingwill have limitedeffectson turnout
and thecomposition of theelectorate. By failing to address the
structureof electoral competition, even these reformsmay have
littleeffecton public engagementwith representativedemocracy.
Changes in districtingpractices, then,may offer the greatest
prospect for increasing electoral competition.Districting prac
tices inArizona and Iowa have been held as models forbetter
practices.McDonald (2007) shows in his contribution to this
symposium thatfew states use such outcome-based districting
practices thatemphasize competition, and thatenforcementof
competition criteria relies on state, rather than federal courts. If
uncompetitive elections are mainly theproduct of a "natural"
patternof like partisans locating in similar places (rather than
gerrymanders),even themost non-partisan, independentSMSP
districtingplans may be unable to affectelectoral competition.
Yet among themany reforms to attractattention frompolitical
science thisdecade, those targetingdistrictingpractices and dis
trictmagnitude are themost explicit in aiming to alter the struc
tureof elections to increase electoral competition.
The argument about electoral reformshere may be under
stood in termsof a baseball analogy. Administrative reformsare
analogous to perfecting how balls, strikes,and base-running are
called in a baseball game. Accurate calls are critical, but they
are not likely to fill the standswith fans. People watch a game
to see their teamwin, or because of interestin an important
game. Perfect scoring ismeaningless if only one team takes the
field, and attendancewill sufferif two teams are playing thatno
one can cheer for.

Notes
1. There has also been a steady increase in the net likes and dislikes that
partisans cite about their rival party's presidential candidates since 1956.
2. Homogeneous
one-party districts may elect ideologically extreme
et al. (2001) find competitive races are more likely
members. Ansolabehere
to produce moderate candidates. Also see Fiorina (1973); Sullivan
laner (1978).
3. Marginal, centrist Democrats
(according to DW-NOMINATE

and Us

scores)

included:Salazar (CO 03); Higgins (NY 27); Bean (IL 08); Costa (CA 20);

Barrow (GA 12).
4. E.g., Sordel
.644; Taylor

(NC

(IN 09) .518; Hostettler
11) .537.

(IN 02)

.712; Choc?la

(IN 02)

5. The Supreme Court has reduced advance registration to 30 days
maximum. Motor Voter registration, early voting, and the expansion of
no-excuse absentee voting have occurred while turnout remained stagnant.
6. Turnout by voting-age population (VAP) oscillated below a high
point of 55% from 1972 to 2004, after being higher in the 1960s. Michael
demonstrates that as a percent of voting-eligible population
McDonald
(VEP), turnout in 2004 actually approached the higher levels of the
1960s.
7. This was in reference to presidential elections under the Electoral

College.
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